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Summary:
The study demonstrates the potential of such attacks using a Time-to-Digital Converter (TDC)--based in-band control side-channel attack. In this paper, we present a novel countermeasure called Mini-CAT to protect FPGA-CNN accelerators against power-based side-channel attacks by splitting the computations in the first CNN layer. This method obscures power consumption, significantly reducing the likelihood of input data leakage. Experimental results show that the attack success rate is reduced from 71% to 37%, achieving a 34% improvement in security, while maintaining a classification accuracy above 97%. Furthermore, our experiments show a latency reduction of approximately 16.7%. The increased hardware overhead is acceptable, with LUT usage rising by only 1.01% due to the defence logic. Our work confirms that the proposed defence effectively mitigates these risks without compromising FPGA accelerator performance and without introducing any more redundant hardware.Author(s):
Jing He
University of Southampton
United Kingdom
Mark Zwolinski
University of Southampton
United Kingdom