Full Program
Summary:
The traditional x86 memory model inherently lacks enforceable trust boundaries allowing unverified executables and libraries to share process memory. This model assumes the integrity of the operating system and toolchain yet it remains susceptible to code injection unauthorized execution and privilege escalation attacks.This position paper proposes a hardware-enforced sub-process isolation model that mandates digitally signed executables ensuring runtime verification and execution integrity. We introduce a Trust-by-Choice execution framework enabling executables to dynamically assess and regulate dependencies mitigating supply chain threats. Additionally we introduce compiler-assisted memory isolation by integrating Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) into the C toolchain enhancing confidentiality and integrity while also suppressing arbitrary code execution between executable modules. Finally we introduce Share-by-default and Share-by-Choice models of data isolation.
By embedding trust enforcement into hardware our approach eliminates reliance on OS-based security provides least privilege enforcement and applies zero trust principles at the architectural level. This model provides a scalable backward-compatible
Author(s):
Mark Nelson
University of Hawaii at Manoa
United States
Mehdi Mirakhorli
University of Hawaii at Manoa
United States